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IN nm SUPREME COJRT 
OF THE 
STA TE OF UTAH 
C~UDIA HILL, by and through ( 
her Guardian Ad Litem, ) 
MARY HIIL FOGEL, ( 
) 
Plainti.f.f and Appellant, ( Case No. 
) 
vs. ( 12082 
) 
GRAND CENTRAL, INC., ( 
A Corporation, ) 
( 
De.f endant and Respondent.) 
BRIEF OF APPEll.ANT 
STATEMENT OF IBE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brou~ht by Claudia 
Hill, a minor, by and through her Guard-
ian Ad Litem, Mary Hill Fogel, against 
the De.fendant Corporation upon an action 
o.f a libel occasioned by the Respondent 
discharging the Plaintif.f-Appellant .from 
her employment as a Cashier on the grounds 
1 
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of misconduct, in that the station 
which she operated had excess shortage 
in the register. The Appellant alleg-
ing that the false charge was injurious 
to her in her trade and profession as a 
Cashier, and further, was done with 
malice and that there was a breech of a 
conditional privilege and an excessive 
publication of sa~e. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Defendant-Respondent made a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, U?On the 
grounds that Appellant had failed to 
produce evidence to support allegations 
of actual malice on the part of the Re-
spondent. The M:>tion for ~mmary Judgment 
was granted by the Court in favor of the 
Respondent and against the Appellant on 
the O:>urt's finding of no cause of action. 
2 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the 
Lower Court's Order granting a Motion 
for Summary Judgment of no cause of 
action in favor of the Res?ondent, and 
that the Supreme Court order, that the 
case be remanded back to the Lower Court 
so that the Appellant may have a jury 
determine the facts and assess the damages 
which were inflicted upon the Appellant 
by the Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, who was the Plaintiff in 
the Lower Court, wi 11 be refer red to in 
this Brief as Appellant, and the Defen-
dant in the Lower Court will be referred 
to in this Brief as Respondent. 
The Aµpellant was employed by the 
Respondent in a check-out station as a 
Cashier, operating one of a number of 
3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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such check-out stations on the premises 
of the Respondent in Ogden, Utah. (Rl) 
The Respondent admits that the 
monies in the register of the Cashier 
was checked only one time in a twenty-
four hour operational period (R6A), and 
that there was no reconciliation of 
money in the register, as the register 
and its contents transferred from 
Cashier to Cashier so that no individual 
had personal resoonsibility for an account-
ing of the register totals at any time. 
(R6A) 
The Respondent further admits that 
there were as many as six persons oper-
ating the same cash register during any 
particular period during which the Appel-
lant was in the employment of the said 
Resoondent. (R6A} The Appellant has 
alleged that there were many more than 
six persons, during the course of a daily 
4 
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operation of the register, who would be 
employed in handling the same register 
and the same funds therein. (R8) The 
Appellant further has stated that some 
of the persons who would be call~d upon 
to operate the cash register during the 
course of a day would be regular retail 
sales personnel who had no training in 
the capacity of Cashier. (Rl) 
The Respondent stated: 
1. That there was no record kept by 
the Respondent as to the amount of money 
in a register in relation to any particu-
lar cashier. (R6A) 
2. That it did not keep records of 
the daily employment shift of the cashiers 
or their names. (R6A) 
3. The Respondent has no knowledge 
of any person or persons who have charged 
the Plaintiff with the improper taking of 
5 
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funds from the Respondent. {R6A) 
4. That the Respondent has never 
charged the Appellant with the taking 
of funds. (R6A) 
5. That the Respondent never had 
any conversation with the ~ppellant, 
charging or concerning the register 
shortages. {R6A) 
6. That at various times during 
the daily operation of the business, 
money was removed from the various cash 
registers and no record is kept of the 
person or persons who are authorized to 
remove such monies or the amount of money 
so removed. {R6A) 
The Appellant was discharged from 
her place of employment with the Respon-
dent on December 21, 1969, {Rl) with the 
only notice being a discharge slip which 
stated on it that the reason for being 
6 
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r 
I 
fired was "misconduct" and that the 
explanation on the slip fo~ the miscon-
duct stated "excess shortage in the 
register in which she worked." (Rl) 
The libelous discharge slip was 
written by Helen Fitzpatrick under the 
orders of John Davis, (R6A) the store 
manager, the unsealed discharge slip 
was then given to others and more than 
five persons handled the libelous dis-
charge order (R8) before its delivery 
to the Appellant herein, Claudia Hill, 
unenveloped and not sealed. (Rl) 
Upon Mo ti on of the Respondent for 
a ~mr.ia ry Judgment against the Appellant, 
(Rll) the Lower Court issued an Order 
that the Motion be granted, (RlO) in that 
the matter was one of conditional privi-
lege and that the Appellant had produced 
no evidence of actual malice, and that 
it appeared that there was no genuine 
7 
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issue as to any material fact, thereby 




GRANTING OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUJ)Q\iENT CANNOT ISSUE WHEN FACTS BEFORE 
TIE Ca.JRT PRESENT TRIABLE ISSUES. 
The Respondent's plea in a Motion 
for Summary Judgment is a drastic remedy 
and one that should not be granted ex-
cept upon the clear showing that there 
are not issues as to any material facts. 
The Trial of any action based only upon 
Affidavits and the Pleadings before the 
Court is and can be self-serving. It is 
ordinary Hornbrook Law that the granting 
of a Summary Judgment should be granted 
only on a complete absence of any genuine 
issues of fact apparent from the evidence 
8 
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before a Court, and that all doubts 
thereon must be resolved against the 
party moving for a summary Judgment. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure was not intended to provide a 
substitute for the regular trial of 
cases in which there are disputed issues 
of fact upon which the outcome of the 
litigation may depend, and it should be 
invoked with caution, to the end that 
litigants can be offered a trial, where 
there is a bona fide dispute of the ma-
terial facts. 
Citing from Tennant vs. Peoria and 
P. V. Ry. Company, 321 U.S. 29, 64 S.Ct. 
409, the Court stated on Page 412: "It 
is not the function of a Court to search 
the record for conflicting circumstantial 
evidence in order to take the case away 
from a jury, on the theory that the case 
gives equal support to inconsistent and 
9 
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uncertain inferences. The focal point 
of Judicial review is the reasonableness 
of the particular inference or conclu-
sion drawn by the jury. It is the Jury, 
not the Court, which is a fact finding 
party. It weighs the contradictory evi-
dence and inferences, judges the credi-
bility of witnesses, receives expert 
instructions, and draws the ultimate 
conclusion as to the facts. The very 
escence of its function is to select, 
from among the conflicting inferences and 
conclusions, that, which it considers 
most reasonable. The conclusions, whether 
it relates to negligence, causation, or 
other factual matter, cannot be ignored." 
The Supreme Court of the United 
States stated in Stevens vs. Howard D. 
Johnson Company, 181 Fed.2d. 390: 
"It must not be forgotten, that in 
actions at law, the Trial by Jury of 
10 
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--1 
disputed questions of fact is guaran-
teed by the Constitution, and that even 
questions of Law, arising in a case in-
volving questions of fact, can be more 
satisfactorily decided when the facts 
are fully before the Court, than it is 
possible on Pleadings and Affidavits. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment authorized 
by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which in effect legalizes 
'speaking demurrer,' is an important case 
1n preventing undue delays in the trial 
of actions in which there is no real de-
fense, but it should not be granted, only 
where it is perfectly clear that no issue 
of fact is involved and that inquiry into 
the facts is not desirable to clarify the 
application of the Law." 
It has been further held, that the 
above is true even where there is no dis-
pute as to the evidentiary facts in the 
11 
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case, but only as to the conclusions to 
be drawn therefrom. Hawkinson vs. 
Dennis, 166 Fed.2d. 6lj also 152 Fed.2d. 
453, 149 Fed.2d. 945; 133 Fed.2d. 17. 
The Lower Court clearly evidenced this 
very fundamental reason for a Jury eval-
uation of facts when, as the very basis 
for the Lower Court's decision in the 
case at bar, the Court stated as its 
reason for granting the Summary Judgment, 
"the words used in the discharge are as 
capable of allegations of neglect or in-
competency as the one of theft, being 
caoable of either implication." (R16) 
The Restatement, Torts, Section 614, 
outlines the decision of functions be-
tween Judge and Jury in defamatory actions 
as follows: 
1. Tile Court determines whether a 
communication is ca:>able of a defamatory 
meaning. 
12 
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2. The Jury determines whether a 
communication, capable of a defamatory 
meaning, was so understood by its re-
cipient. 
The Lower Court stated the communi-
cation was "capable" of a defamatory 
meaning. ( Rl6) The Appellant did "under-
stand" the meaning to be defamatory. (Rl) 
Moore Federal Practice, Page 2115, 
states: 
"The Summary Judgment on Motion, 
therefore, by a Defendant in an action, 
should never be entered except where the 
Defendant is entitled to its allowance 
beyond all doubt. To warrant its entry, 
the facts conceded by the Plaintiff were 
demonstrated beyond reasonable question 
to exist, should show the right of the 
Defendant to a Judgment with such clarity 
as to leave no room for controversy, and 
they should show affirmatively that 
13 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Plaintiff would not be entitled to re-
cover under any reasonable circumstances." 
The Lower O:>urt, by its own direct state-
ment, (Rl6) acknowledged the very type of 
interpretation that by every standard of 
Constitutional Law is the function of a 
Jury to weigh and determine, not a Court 
on a Motion for Slmrnary Judgment. 
It is submitted that Affidavits and 
Pleadings are a dangerous and unsatis-
factory substitute for oral testimony 
before a Court and Jury. The right of 
examination and cross-examination in the 
presence of the Trier of the Facts has 
often be~n acclaimed as the most valuable 
attribute of the Common Law system. And 
particularly in a case where the mo ti v-a-
ti on may be an essential one for the 
Trier of Facts, tu determine the truth by 
bein9 able to observe the witnesses and 
weigh motives against evidence and deQeanor 
14 
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to determine truthfulness, would seem 
to be a basic and compelling issue to 
do justice to the parties herein. Credi-
bility and demeanor can be weighed only 
by the Trier of Facts, which is not evi-
denced from Affidavits and Pleadings. 
The Utah <~preme Court stated in 
Samms vs. Eccles, 11 Ut.2d. 289; 358 
P.2d. 344; "That some claims may be spur-
ious, should not compel those who admin-
ister justice to shut their eyes to 
serious wrongs and let them go without 
being brought to account. It is a 
function of Courts and Juries to deter-
mine whether claims are valid or false. 
This responsibility should not be shunned 
merely because the task may be difficult 
to perform." The validity of the motives 
of the Defendant in branding the perfor-
mance of its employee, the Appellant 
herein, as "misconduct" (Rl) in that 
15 
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there was excess shortage of the register 
in which she workec~, ( Rl) is shown by the 
very statements of the Respondent itself 
to be totally contradictory and is at-
odds with the statements of the Respon-
dent, (R6A) as evidenced from the Pleadings 
and Affidavits in evidence before this 
Court, and ~ust in itself lend support to 
the claim of the Appellant for injury per 
se in the profession and occupation in 
which she was engaged and evidences actual 
malice by reason of its making and effect. 
POINT II 
AN EM?LOYERS PRIVILEGE IS A QUALI-
FIED PRIVILEGE ONLY. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Williams 
vs. Standard Examiner Publishing Co:npany, 
_N_o_v_e_m_b_e_r __ 2_8 ..... ,_1_9_3_3 .... ,_""_> 7_, _P_._2_d_. _l , stated in 
its comprehensive coverage of a discussion 
on qualified and cr,nditional privileges, 
16 
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that privileged communications rest upan 
grounds of public policy, - the necessity 
of the individual to surrender his per-
sonal rights for the common welfare. And 
the Court further stated that "a qualified 
privileged com~unication extends to all 
communications made bona fide upon any 
subject matter in which a party communi-
cating has an interest, or in reference 
to which he has a duty, to a person having 
a corresponding interest or duty." The 
Court further pointed out, that the use 
and calling upon the privilege, when 
matters have been stated or written that 
are untrue, and in such cases, the quali-
fied or conditional privilege merely 
raises a p rima facia :->resumption in favor 
of the occasion, but qualified this privi-
lege in stating, that if a defamatory 
matter was uttered or ~ublished with actual 
cnalice, the qualified privilege would be 
17 
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lost; and further held that whether or 
11ot a motive is malicious is generally 
a fact question for a jury. 
In Spielbe~_vs. A. Kuhn and Bros., 
January 23, 1911, 160 P. 1027, the Court 
stated in this case, which concerned the 
statements made by an employer of his 
employee, that whether or not the state-
ments were ~rivileged depended upon 
whether or not they were made in good 
faith and without malice, and that both 
of these questions were jury questions 
and must be submitted to a jury for deter-
mination of such. 
In the case at bar, we see where 
from the Answers to the Interrogatories 
and the Affidavit of the Appellant, it 
is clearly set fort~i that there was no 
possible way that the Respondent could, 
or did determine, that the Plaintiff 
herein had been dishonest in any manner 
lK 
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whatsoever, (R6A) and that there was not 
only no method or bookkeeping system for 
contributing to any single employee, of 
the large number of e~ployees who handled 
the same money, in the same register, 
during the course of a full days O?era-
tion of such a cash register, (R6A) re-
sponsibility for a balanced cash register, 
but that further, at no time was the 
Plaintiff ever reprimanded, nor had dis-
cussions with management relative to any 
alleged shortage in the register, (R6A) 
whether attributable to her conduct or 
that of the many others with whom she 
worked in the sa~e cash register. Further, 
the Respondent states flatly that he does 
not believe, nor charge, that the Appellant 
did take any of its funds,(R6A) nor was 
there any specific way that the Appellant 
could be charged with any contribution to 
"excess shortage in the register in which 
19 
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J 
she worked." ( R6A) The Utah Supreme 
Court in Combes vs. Montgo~e.!.Y_ Ward & 
Com?any, 228 P.2d. 272, wherein a 
shortage of funds was discovered in a 
cash register and the employee was dis-
charged at the end of the day as a result 
thereof, the Trial Court stated, that 
taking the circumstances all together and 
in discharging the employee at the end of 
the day, the Court stated that this would 
impute dishonesty to the Plaintiff and 
amount to slander per se. The Court 
stating further, "It is not on the words 
used, but their im?ort in the light of 
all of the surrounding circumstances that 
determines whether or not they are slan-
derous." 
The Ap?ellant'~ case herein in this 
action, requires l~ss imagination for any 
imputation of slander or libel per se, in 
that upon being discharged, she was handed 
20 
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a discharge slip, which stated as the 
reason for discharge "misconduct'' and 
in explanation of the term, "misconduct," 
which is a requirement of the State of 
Utah in the issuance of blue slips to 
employees, it alleged "excess shortage 
in the register in which she worked." 
(R6A) The Respondent herein would have 
the Court believe that this on its face 
imputed something other than exactly what 
the words stated, that there was "miscon-
duct" and there was "excess shortage." 
{R6A) These words are so plain and simple 
that there is only one interpretation for 
both of these elements taken together, 
and that is the imputation and charge 
that the conduct of Appellant herein was 
as the words are set forth. 
The Court in the Co~bes case, supra, 
adopted the ruling of Harrison vs. Garrett, 
132 N.C. 172, 43 S.E. 594, which was also 
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a case of a conditional privilege. 'The 
Court stated, that such a qualified 
privilege was protected where the writer 
had an interest and the person addressed 
had a corresponding interest or duty, and 
that the statement was made in protection 
of that interest, but it held further 
that "There must be an honest belief in 
the truth of the statement," and further, 
that, when these facts are found to exist, 
the communication is protected by the Law, 
unless the Plaintiff can show malice on 
the Defendant's part. There can be no 
basis for stating that the Respondent 
herein had an honest belief in the truth 
of the statement, in that every element 
set forth in its own writings and in its 
own Pleadings and Interrogatory Answers 
(R6A) now before this Court, show that 
there was no possible basis for believing 
that the Ap?ellant herein had anything 
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whatsoever to do with any 'misconduct' 
on her part or 'excess shortage in her 
register.' And that, therefore, regard-
less of the existence, or non-existence, 
of the privilege, the Respondent destroyed 
the privilege by its lack of honest be-
lief in its conduct. It was further set 
forth in the Combes case, supra, in 
quoting from NewellL Slander and Libel, 
on Page 1111; "The jury, however, will 
be the proper tribunal to determine the 
question of express malice where evidence 
of ill will is forthcoming; but if, taken 
in connection with admitted facts, the 
words complained of are such as must have 
been used honestly and in good faith by 
the Defendant, the Judge may withdraw the 
case from a jury, and direct a verdict for 
the Defendant." 
Newell on Slander and Libel, 3rd 
Edition, Section 499, Page 480, further 
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states "That the theory of privilege, in 
connection with the Law of Defamation, 
involves a variety of conditions of some 
nicety, and also a doctrine not always 
of easy application to a set of facts; 
and such being the same in any trial, 
whether civil or criminal, while the ques-
tion of libel or not libel, malice or no 
malice, are matters of fact for a jury, 
the question of privilege or no privilge, 
where the circumstances under which the 
communication was made are not disputed, 
is entirely one of Law for the Judge, but, 
where such circumstances arP in doubt, 
the jury must find what they were or what 
the Defendant thou<Jht they were." The 
Court in the Stevens vs. Howard Johnson 
~' supra, in its Findings of Rights and 
Privileges under conditional and privi-
leged communications stated further, "It 
follows, therefore, that it was the duty 
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of the Defendant to plead and prove the 
communication made to the police officers 
in the case at bar, was qualifiedly privi-
leged." 
Louisianna Oil Corporation, et al., 
vs. Sam Renno, 157 s.o. 705, 98 A.L.R. 
1296, states, "A communication made in 
good faith and on a subject matter in 
which the person making it has an interes~ 
or in reference to which he has a duty, is 
privileged if made to a person or persons 
having a corresponding interest or duty, 
even though it conveys matter which with-
out this privilege would be slanderous, 
provided the statement is made without 
malice and in good faith. The premise of 
the Appellant in the Pleadings {Rl) and 
Affidavit (RB) is sufficient to make, as 
a question of fact for the Trier of Facts, 
whether or not the statements of the Re-
spondent can pass the qualification of 
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"without malice and in good faith." The 
Court in the ~sianna Oil case, supra, 
stated that the privilege is qualified, 
in that protection is not absolute, but 
depends entirely upon the honesty of 
purpose with which a statement is made. 
The Court further stated that the sincer-
ity with which a statement is made, if so 
found, does not alone justify the making 
of the statements as there must be facts 
and circumstances which reasonably impose 
a duty to make the statements. The evi-
dence before the Lower Court could not 
justify the statements written. 
Totten vs. Sun Printing & Publishing 
Association, {1901; C.C.) 109 Fed. 289, 
and annotated in 66 A.L.R. 1499, in dis-
cussing the case of an employer-employee 
re la ti onshi p stated "It is generally held 
that statements with reference to discharge 
from private employment are qualifiedly 
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privilege, if made by one having a duty 
to make them or in response to an inquiry, 
and if made to one having an interest in 
the subject matter of the statement. How-
ever, in accordance with the general 
principles of libel and slander, if a 
statement is made maliciously or with 
intent to injure, the privilege is des-
troyed and the words are actionable." 
While the Appellant makes no contest of 
the right of her employer to discharge 
her if the employer so saw fit, there can 
be no justification for the libelous and 
false accusation of misconduct on the 
part of the Appellant and the charging 
of excess register shortages to her, (R6A) 
when the Respondent has admitted in its 
Pleadings that the Appellant did not take 
any funds from it (R6A), nor had ever 
reprimanded or had information concerning 
the Appellant which would in any way 
27 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reflect or carry out the charges set 
forth on the discharge slip. {R6A) In 
Pattison vs. Jones, 66 A.L.R. 1506, 
the Court held "that even assuming 
there is a privilege, the question whe-
ther it was made with or without malice 
was a question for the jury to determine." 
In the instant case the Respondent 
by its very own statements has lent no 
credibility to its charge of "miscon-
duct" and "shortage" on the part of the 
Appellant. (R6A) The Respondent has 
evidenced a proper basis of a charge of 
actual malice, which is not lessened by 
any alibi of not recognizing the meaning 
of the harsh accusation evidenced by the 
statements on the Appellant's discharge 
order. Tile Respondent had to be aware 
that a "misconduct" discharge order 
penalized the Appellant in being granted 
unemployment compensation and stood for-
ever on the records of the Respondent 
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and the State Employment files (R8) 
forever branding the Appellant, a 17 
year-old young lady, (Rl) from any 
position of trust and reliability. Any 
inquiry to either of these two sources, 
reporting the Appellant's discharge for 
"misconduct" and excessive shortage in 
the register which she worked," (R6A) 
could not possibly receive the charita-
ble interpretation of the Lower Court 
that they inferred mere incompetency. 
{Rl6) This Court is further prayed to 
find one iota of basic fact to support 
even a shred of truth in the libelous 
charge of "incompetency" in the record 
before this Court. 
There is absolute clarity in the 
clear meaning of the words used by the 
Defendant in regards to the Appellant, 
and the Court stated in D. F. Marion vs. 
Minnie Davis, 55 A.L.R. 171, "The right 
29 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the enjoyment of a private reputation, 
unassailed by malicious slander, is of 
ancient origin, and is necessary to 
human society. A good reputation is an 
element of personal security, and is pro-
tected by the Constitution equally with 
the right to the enjoyment of life, 
liberty, and property." The Court fur-
ther stated in ref erring to the statements 
made by the Defendant concerning the Plain-
tiff, "That words are to be taken in their 
natural meaning and according to the sense 
to which they appeared to have been used, 
and the idea they are adopted to convey to 
those who heard them. A forced construc-
tion is not to be put on them in order to 
relieve the Defendant from liability." 
Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Com-
pany vs. Carl Ingle, 229 Ky. 578, 17 S.W. 
2d. 709, was an action wherein a Chauffer 
was discharged by his employer for 
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drinking, allegedly during the hours of 
his employment. The words made public 
stated, "Ingle discharged for drinking." 
The Court stated, that in their ordinary 
acceptance, the meaning of the words 
would be that he was unfit for his occu-
pation by reason of his indulgence in 
drinking. The Court stated, "It is uni-
formly held that words falsely spoken or 
written are libelous per se, if they 
impute unfitness to perform the duties 
of an office or employment, or if they 
prejudice a person in his profession or 
trade." In comparing these words with 
the words of the Respondent in the in-
stant case, the allegation that a Cashier 
had "excessive shortage in her register" 
and had been discharged for "misconduct" 
can only impute unfitness. The Lower 
Court stated that the words used in the 
discharge, "are as capable of allegations 
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of neglect or incompetency as they are 
of theft, being capable of either impli-
cation.'' It was stated in Miles vs. 
Louis Wasmer, Inc., Supreme Court of 
Washington, 20 P.2d. 847, "In determin-
ing whether the words spoken were defa-
matory, they must be construed in the 
sense in which they would ordinarily be 
understood by persons hearing them." 
It is submitted to this Honorable 
Court that the term "misconduct" coupled 
with the phrase "excess shortage in her 
register" if it does have a dual meaning, 
its ordinary meaning would be exactly 
what it sets forth, in that "misconduct" 
itself means a wrongdoing. In Pattison 
vs. Jones, supra, the employer in refer-
ring to a former employee wrote to a 
prospective employer that the "Plaintiff 
had been discharged for 'misconduct'." 
The Court held that the question of malic~ 
32 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by reason of the use of the term "mis-
conduct," was in itself a question for 
the jury to determine. In Porak vs. 
SWeitzers, Inc., Supreme Court of Montana, 
237 P. 633, the Court stated that "Oppro-
brious words must be construed according 
to their usual popular and natural mean-
ing and common acceptance." 
Yelle vs. Cowles Publishing Company, 
9.lpreme Court of Washington, 278 P.2d. 
671, referring to a slander, wherein there 
was no unconditional privilege, stated, 
"words spoken, however, which are not in 
fact true, are not privileged." Reed vs. 
Melnick, Court of Appeals of New Mexico, 
462 P.2d. 148, the Court adopted the 
statement of Prosser, Law of Torts, Sec-
tion 107, at 780, 3rd Edition, 1964, in 
stating, "It is generally held that words 
falsely written of a party, which preju-
dice such party in his occupation or 
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trade, are actionable per se." 
I. Harper and James, the Law of 
Torts, Section 5.12, at 381, 1956, makes 
the following statement: "The Law of 
Defamation has always stressed the pecu-
niary aspects of injury to reputation. 
It is to be expected, therefore, that 
special emphasis was placed on those de-
famatory charges, the tendency of which 
was to interfere with ones livelihood." 
Kee vs. Armstrong, Byrd & Company, 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 182 P. 494, 
"Words used in an alleged slanderous 
communication article are to be construed 
by the most natural and obvious meaning, 
and in a sense that would be understood 
by those to whom it was addressed.'' 
Washer vs. Bank of America National 
Trust & Saving Association, Supreme Court 
of California, 136 P.2d. 297, was a case 
wherein an employee brought an action 
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against his employer for libel and slander. 
The Court stated "insofar as Fenton's 
statement tended to injure the Appellant 
in his occupation, it was unnecessary for 
him to allege special damages." The Court 
held, "The :Appellant has alleged, not only 
that the statement is fa.lse, but also that 
it was known by Penton to be false at the 
time he made it, and, furthermore, that he 
did not have probable or any cause for be-
lieving it to be true. In addition, he 
has alleged that the statement was made 
for the purpose of injuring, disgracing, 
and defaming him, and interferring with 
his ability to obtain employment. Such 
allegation constitutes a clear and defi-
nite pleading of malice in fact." The 
instant case is on all fours with this 
statement of legal doctrine. 
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO GENUINE 
ANO FULL DISCOVERY BEFORE JUDICIAL IE-
TERM INA TION. 
A chronology of the time element in 
this case is essential in order to make 
the point herein desired to be established. 
A Complaint was filed on January 6, 
1970, (Rl) and a Glardian Ad Litem ap-
proved for the minor Appellant on Janu-
ary 8, 1970, (R3) with the 9leriff's 
return of service being made on January 12, 
1970. (Rl3) No Answer was filed by the 
Respondent, but a Motion to .Dismiss was 
made on January 23, 1970. (R4) February 5, 
1970, the Court denied the Motion to Dis-
miss and granted the Appellant thirty days 
to establish evidence of malice. (R4) The 
Appellant served Interrogatories February 
25, 1970, (RS) and Answers to the Inter-
rogatories were mailed by the Respondent 
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March 3, 1970. (R6A) Motion for Summary 
Judgment was made March 17 without Affi-
davit by the Respondent. (R6) Affidavit 
in Denial of Motion was filed by Appellant 
March 31. (RS) Summary Judgment was 
granted to the Respondent by the Lower 
Court on April 3, 1970. (RlO) 
The Lower C.ourt at the granting of 
the Motion stated as a conclusion, "as 
far as I know, there has been no other 
effort to take Depositions or anything 
else. It would appear to the Court that 
the Plaintiff *** has been given a reason-
able amount of time to produce evidence 
or show that he has some and has not done 
so. The action appears to be one of har-
assment. The Motion to Dismiss is granted." 
(R16) 
Am. Jur. on Pleadings, Section 332, 
states that a Motion to Dismiss conceeds 
the truth of the matters alleged if they 
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are well pleaded, and construes the alle-
gations of a pleading most favorable in 
the Pleader's favor; and further states, 
that the Complainant is entitled to the 
benefit, not only of the facts stated in 
the Bill, but also to legitimate infer-
ences to be drawn therefrom. Stryker vs. 
Barbers Super Market, Inc., Court of Ap-
peals in New Mexico, December 1969, 462 
P.2d. 629, was an action for libel. Dle 
Court stated, "A Motion to Dismiss for 
failure to state a claim upon which re-
lief can be granted, *** admits well 
pleaded facts. ***" This Court also 
adopted the statement of Stewart vs. Ging, 
64 N.M. 270, 327 P.2d. 333, 1958,and 
stated, "Thus, when the Trial Court dis-
mi ssed the Complaint, it was admitted 
that Defendants had included defamatory 
matter in the Bernalillo County Complaint 
and it done so falsely and maliciously." 
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February 5, 1970, the Court in its 
Order denied the Motion to Dismiss, but 
alleged that Paragraphs ten and eleven of 
Appellant's Complaint alleged actual ma-
lice; and for that reason, the Complaint 
did not state a claim, but did grant the 
Appellant thirty days to establish evi-
dence of actual malice; her failure to so 
do resulting in the granting of a Summary 
Judgment for the Respondent. (R4} 
The Appellant seeking adequate dis-
covery to comply with the Order of the 
Court, on February 25, 1970, delivered to 
the Respondent's, Interrogatories to be 
answered fully, completely, and with a 
revelation of all known facts within the 
knowledge of the Respondent. (RS) The 
Respondent's Answer to the Interrogatories 
were posted in the mail to the Appellant 
on March 3, 1970, (R6A) but were not com-
plete, did not fully reveal the information 
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known to the Respondent, and the Affiant 
thereto was the Attorney for the Respon-
dent. The Affidavit of the Affiant was 
made by the Attorney for the Corporate 
Chain Respondent, who stated, "That he 
makes these foregoing Answers to Interro-
gatories on behalf of the Defendant as 
its Attorney for the reason that Affiant 
is better informed as to the information 
necessary to answer Defendant's Interroga-
tories." {R6A} The sincerity and compe-
tency of the Affiant is not questioned, 
but it is noted that the Respondent's 
Answers to the following Interrogatories 
is not on all fours with the Affidavits 
and Pleadings of the Appellant: 1, 2, 3, 
7, 20, 21, and 22. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment was 
heard on the 3rd day of Apri 1, 1970, {R6) 
and the Court, having before it only the 
Pleadings of the Appellant and the Affidavit 
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of the Appellant in denial thereof, 
issued the Order granting the ~tion for 
Summary Judgment. (RIO) The Lower Court 
based its ruling, as shown by the Court 
Transcript, on the premise that the Court, 
while recognizing that the statements of 
the Respondent could imply theft, chose 
to make a Judicial interpretation that it 
was also capable of only meaning neglect 
or incompetency, and further, that the 
Appellant "has no evidence that the alle-
gation is not true. The Defendant has 
evidence that there were shortages in 
the ti 11. The Plaintiff has no evidence 
of any hatred or ill will ***·" (R16) 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that formal exceptions 
to rulings or orders of the Court are 
unnecessary, but it is sufficient if the 
party makes known to the Court the action 
which it desires, takes his objection to 
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the action of the Court and his grounds 
therefore. The Transcript will reveal 
that Counsel for the Appellant did all 
of these and further, alleged that Appel-
lant had not yet completed the discovery 
necessary in an action of this type, (Ra) 
and th~ record will show that no Readiness 
for Trial had been filed by the Appellant 
herein. 
Scoville vs. Kellogg ~les Company, 
Supreme Court of Utah, 261 P.2d. 933, is 
authority by the Supreme Court of Utah, 
that on Appeal by Plaintiff from a Judg-
ment entered on a direct verdict of no 
cause of action, the Court is required to 
review the evidence in a light most fav-
orable to the Plaintiff-Appellant. It was 
further held by this Court in Kirchgestner 
vs. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, 
233 P.2d. 699, that clear and convincing 
evidence and proof of such is only in such 
42 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
instance as there remains no serious 
doubt or substantial doubt as to the 
correctness of the conclusion; and fur-
ther, that the mind has been persuaded 
by the evidence before it as to the pro-
bable truth or correctness of the facts 
it purports to prove. 'Olis Court has 
further stated in Ulibarry vs. Olristenso~ 
275 P.2d. 170, that an additional basis 
for the granting of a Summary Judgment on 
an affirmative defense, that the degree 
of evidence and proof in such an instance 
must be clear, unequivocol, and convinc-
ing. It is submitted to this Court that 
through even the use of the ''Preponderance 
Rule of Evidence," the evj dence of the 
Respondent herein must fall far short of 
its mark. 
Rules 26 to 37 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure show by reason of the 
discussions of the Compilers notes con-
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tained as footnotes under these varjous 
rules, the addition of these rules was 
with the intent of an adoption of a lib-
eral method of fact finding, and its 
purpose is in general aid to Rule 8 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
is set forth in (1) a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the 
Pleader is entitled to relief. This 
Court stating in Campbell vs. Taylor, 3 
Utah 325, 3 P. 445, ''A Complaint need 
allege no more than will constitute prima 
facia, a cause of action, or defense; all 
beyond this is surp !usage." The SUpreme 
Court of Nevada in Dodd vs. Cowgi 11, 463 
P.2d. 482, December 1969, stated, "The 
District Judge found that the Answers to 
Respondent's Request for Admissions 
failed to comply with N.R.C.P. 36, in 
that the Answers were not truthful and 
were not set forth with the specificity 
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, 
required by the Rule. We agree." It is 
further set forth in Barron and Holtzoff, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 
834, Page 513, in discussing Requests for 
Admissions, that "The admissions or denials 
must be forthright, specific, and unquali-
fied." 
The Utah S\lpreme Court in Blackham 
vs. Snellgrove, February 28, 1955, 280 
P.2d. 453, adopted the language of Mr. Jus-
tice Murphy, who stated in the Hickman vs. 
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 SS. Ct. 385, "The 
Pre-Trial Deposition-Discovery Mechanism 
established by Rules 26 to 37 is one of 
the most significant innovations of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under 
the prior Federal practice, the Pre-Trial 
functions of notice-giving issue-formula-
tion and fact-revelation were performed 
primarily and adequately by the Pleadings. 
Inquiry into the issues and the facts 
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before trial was narrowly confined and 
was often cumbersome in method. The new 
Rules, however, restrict the Pleadings 
to the task of general notice-giving and 
invest the Deposition-Discovery process 
with a vital role.in the preparation be-
fore trial." 
CONCLUSION 
IT IS SUBMI !TED TO THIS HONORABLE 
OOURT IllA T IT WI\ S ERROR TO DIRECT A VER-
DI CT CF SUMMARY JUDG'IENT AND THAT THIS WAS 
A PROPER CASE FOR SUBMISSION TO A JURY, 
FOLLOWING A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR FACT 
FINDING AND DISCDVERY. JUSTICE REQUIRES 
n1E ~SE BE R91ANIED TO n-IE DISTRICT <X>URT 
FOR TRIAL BY JURY. 
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